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INTRODUCTION
Charles Kurzman
The sociology of Islam and Muslim societies is
“hot,” for all the wrong reasons. It is not because
globalization has drawn the world closer together,
or because sociology is internationalizing its
focus beyond its historical interest in Western
Europe and North America. No, the sociology of
Islam is “hot” because of the common but
inaccurate association of Islam with terrorism and
international conflict. The world wants to know
why we are seeing such violence in the name of
Islam, and sociologists -- along with other social
scientists -- are expected to have
answers.Violence and stereotypes related to
Muslims are, sadly, good for business in the
sociology of Islam.

These days, many sociology departments now
want experts on Islam -- job listings related to
Muslim societies have increased significantly
from a decade ago, when no department ever
advertised a position in this area. Articles on
Islam and Muslims are now appearing at a greater
rate in sociology journals. The American
Sociological Review, for instance, has run
approximately six articles on Muslim societies in
the past three years, compared with none in the
nine years before that and only 19 in the previous
38 years. The annual meeting of the American
Sociological Association now features at least one
panel every year on the “Middle East and Muslim
Societies” -- a compromise rubric that bridges
both the older area-studies tradition and newer
cross-regional approaches to the study of Islam.
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We are a small band, those of us who study
these subjects, but we are beginning to get
organized. This newsletter is one of the
mechanisms for our organization, along with the
list-serve and the forthcoming website. I thank
Tuğrul Keskin for his work in getting all of this
set up and running! A related effort, designed to
fit into the area-studies categories that so many
universities and funding agencies use, is the
Mideast Sociology Working Group, whose
information can be found at http://
www.unc.edu/~kurzman/MideastSociology.
Both groups meet informally each year at the
annual meetings of the American Sociological
Association and the Middle East Studies
Association, where scholars can get to know
each other and brainstorm collaborations. The
next of these get-togethers is scheduled for the
ASA meeting in San Francisco: Sunday, August
9, 2009, at 12:15-1:45 p.m., including free lunch
for graduate students (we plan to meet at the
Hilton registration desk and move en masse to a
local café).
As in any network of scholars, we cannot
expect unanimity. Recent events in Iran, for
example, have exposed sharp differences of
opinion among sociologists who study Islam.
Some have cheered the Green Movement, as
the Iranian opposition now calls itself; within
this group, some expressed optimism about the
potential for political and social change in Iran,
while others expressed pessimism and
predicted tragedy. Other sociologists, by
contrast, have expressed disdain toward the

Iranian opposition, viewing it as meaningless
middle-class agitation and a vehicle of Western
imperialism. I have my own opinions on this
subject (if you are interested, you can get a
sense of them at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
story/cms.php?story_id=5017). However, I
would like to make a “meta-point” here about
this disagreement. And that is: bring on the
evidence!

Charles Kurzman is a professor of sociology at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

As sociologists, we have a special expertise in
the collection and analysis of evidence on
controversial social phenomena. Questions of
race relations, economic stratification, gender
processes, world systems, and the like are all
subject for debate -- and these debates all
involve the presentation and evaluation of
evidence. This is not to say that theoretical
insights are worthless, only that these insights
grow with the development of empirical
research. This research may be qualitative or
quantitative, historical or contemporary, micro
or macro, but it all adds to the substance of our
debates.
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In the sociology of Islam, as in other areas of
social science, we have a growing body of
evidence with which to engage our
disagreements. There is survey evidence from
numerous Muslim societies, for example -- the
most prominent of these datasets is the World
Values Survey, which can be analyzed online at
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org, but other
datasets are also available from the Pew Global
Attitudes Project, Demographic and Health
Surveys, and other sources. There is crossnational macro data available from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators
database, various United Nations agencies, and
the specialized datasets constructed by scholars
in various fields. There is further information
available on Islamic political parties, on hajj
participation, on Islamic terrorism, and other
subjects related to Islam. Of course, there is
also a world of qualitative data -- single-case
and comparative -- out there for researchers to
explore. I am not siding with any one form of
data, all of which is open to skeptical scrutiny,
in my opinion. However, I would like to see us
continue to make use of all of this data as we
express our disagreements.
One of the side-effects of being a “hot” field is
that we are often asked about subjects we have
not studied in depth. An “Islam expert” can get
questions from students, colleagues, and
journalists about anything from classical
Islamic sources to contemporary Muslim
attitudes. Wherever there is a news story about
Muslims, we are liable to get asked about it.
None of us could possibly know everything

about Islam and Muslim societies. I think it is
worthwhile to pause for a moment, when we
face one of these issues, and ask ourselves:
What do we really know about this, and what
evidence would we need to examine in order to
offer an informed analysis? One service that
our Sociology of Islam network can provide is
to link up those of us asking these questions
with those of us who have evidence.
Charles Kurzman
June 25, 2009 / Chapel Hill, North Carolina

August 8-11, 2009 in San Francisco, CA for the 104th
Annual Meeting of the American Sociological
Association
THE MIDDLE EAST SOCIOLOGY WORKING
GROUP INFORMAL GATHERING AT ASA
We are pleased to invite all of you, as members of the
Middle East Sociology Working Group, to our semiannual informal gathering at the American
Sociological Association meeting in San Francisco this
August.
The gathering is scheduled for 12:15-1:45 p.m. on
Sunday, August 9, 2009, just after the Thematic
Session, "Communities and Political Engagement in
the Middle East." As is our custom, we will meet at the
conference registration desk and wander somewhere
for a bite. Graduate students' lunch is on the house!
An updated list of Middle East-related ASA panels is
now available at our working group website,
http://www.unc.edu/~kurzman/MideastSociology.
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An Interview with Dr. Y. Tzvi Langermann on Dr. Tzvi Langermann: Well, I learned Arabic
because of my interest in the history of science;
Islamic Studies and Islam in Israel
By Tugrul Keskin and Najm al-Din Yousefi
Tzvi Langermann
was born in Lowell,
Massachusetts. He
received his degrees
from Boston and
H a r v a r d
U n i v e r s i t i e s . D r.
Langermann has
p u b l i s h e d
extensively on
Science
and
Philosophy in Medieval Jewish and Islamic
Cultures, Islamic Astronomy, Jews in Medieval
Islam, and Jews in Yemen. He also teaches “the
Thought of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi” and “Greek
Wisdom in Islamic Civilization.” He is married to
Dina Zilberman, an organizational psychologist;
and is the father of Netanel, Michal, and Amos, all
three children born a few minutes apart from each
other in 2000. Dr. Langermann is the chair of
Arabic Studies at Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan,
Israel. For more information about Dr.
Langermann’s recent work, please visit his
website:
http://www.biu.ac.il/faculty/ytlangermann/
Tugrul Keskin and Najm al-Din Yousefi: Dr.
Langermann, thank you for accepting this
interview with the Sociology of Islam and
Muslim Societies newsletter. First of all, would
you please tell us about yourself and your
research and how you developed your interest in
Islamic Studies?

however, I became increasingly interested in the
interface between science, philosophy and
religious thought in the medieval period, and this
led me to explore Islamic thought. When I took up
the job at Bar Ilan, I was asked to teach Qur'an,
and that really motivated me; it quickly became
not just a teaching assignment, but a very serious
interest.
Keskin and Yousefi: Would you please tell us
why you decided to move to Israel and why you
are interested in studying Islam?
Dr. Langermann: I moved to Israel out of a
sincere feeling that I am returning to my
ancestral homeland. I also want to live in a place
where Jewish customs are integrated into the
rhythm of life, so that I don't have to constantly
make special arrangements in order to observe
the Sabbath and holidays, as I had to do in the
States. Finally, I also wanted to live in a place
with some "oriental" ambiance.
I study Islam for a number of reasons, personal
and professional. I began to study Islam by way
of my studies in the history of science, which
led me to learn Arabic, and which in turn
opened up new worlds for me (as learning a new
language always does); my studies on Muslim
scientists, some of whom (e.g. Ibn Sina) were
major religious thinkers, as well as Jewish
writers who drew upon Muslim writings, led me
to study Islam more deeply. But I must also
confess that, for whatever reason or reasons, I
have never looked upon Islam as something
totally alien.
Keskin and Yousefi: Given the vibrant
intellectual exchange between Jewish and
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Islamic cultures, what do you make of the
modern-era tension between the two cultures
that have culminated in the Arab-Israeli
conflict? Are the ongoing conflicts likely to
have a negative impact on studies of Islamic
culture and history in Israel?
Dr. Langermann: The study of Islamic
cultures and history developed in Israel in the
course of the ongoing and unending conflicts.
I would only add this: in the USA and (maybe
less so) in Europe, Islam is a new thing, at least
in the public sphere, and for that reason many
people are interested in learning about it, so the
opportunities are growing. In Israel that is not
the case. Unfortunately we are suffering now
due to the general neglect of the humanities;
perhaps I should say envaluation of or even
scorn for the humanities. It is that attitude,
rather than any negative feelings coming out of
the conflicts, that is already having a negative
impact.
Keskin and Yousefi: Would you please give us
a brief overview of Islamic Studies in Israeli
universities? How many Islamic Studies centers
are there in Israel, and what are they like? Do
you think that there is enough independent
academic research in Islamic Studies and Islam
within Israeli Universities?
Dr. Langermann: There are no centers that I
know of, nor even departments, that are devoted
to Islamic studies. Our department is simply
called "Arabic". Some people look upon us
simply as the university's Berlitz, and I work
hard to let them know that we are strong in our
offerings in Islamic thought, as well as the
Judaeo-Arabic Cultural Heritage and, of course,
Arabic language and literature. I know that

experts in Islam in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv also
teach in departments of Arabic. There are also
departments and centers devoted to Middle
Eastern Studies. It's hard to say if there is
"enough" research. Can one say if it is enough
to meet the demand, the way one can judge
whether there are enough Toyotas? Obviously
we would like to have more resources at our
disposal. But I really should return to a point
made earlier. What we really would like to see is
a higher appreciation of the humanities—
Islamic studies, yes, but also literature of all
sorts, and history. In Israel's formative years,
under far more difficult economic and other
circumstances, the leadership did appreciate the
humanities; they realized that that's what it's all
about, that's why we sweat and bleed to build a
country.
Keskin and Yousefi: In your research you
have dealt with Jewish philosophers such as
Maimonides who flourished in the cultural
milieu of medieval Islam. In light of your
research, how do you assess the general
attitude of Islamic civilization towards the
Jewish contribution?
Dr. Langermann: Overall, Islamic thinkers
were receptive to Jewish contributions to
medicine and the other sciences, but displayed
very little interest in Jewish writings on
theology and philosophy; but one should
remember, that Jewish writers did not publish
religious writings—that means, in the medieval
period, deliberately initiate diffusion—the way
they did in the sciences. Islamic writers tended
to view contributions to the sciences as
individual—that is, the contribution of an Isaac
Israeli, or, for that matter a Majusi, Masihi, or
Ibn Rushd—rather than the contribution of a
religious or ethnic group.
[5]
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Keskin and Yousefi: Do you think that the
general attitude of Islamic civilization toward
the Jewish contribution has varied significantly
in different time-periods and localities?
Dr. Langermann: Again, we must speak more
of the receptivity towards the work of Jews,
rather than the "Jewish contribution". From the
Islamic point of view, the Jewish contribution to
civilization, if it can be called that, certainly
ended with the Prophet, if not before. However,
the contribution of Jews as individuals was
acknowledged, as you say, in different degrees
depending on the locale and time-period.
Keskin and Yousefi: How have Islamic
traditions in theology, philosophy and science
shaped medieval Jewish thought?
Dr. Langermann: Enormously. Basically, Jews
living in Islamic lands participated in the same
enterprise, the same discourse, as Muslim
thinkers and scientists did. The key point is an
uncompromising insistence upon tawhid.
Knowing just what tawhid means, and the
related (Maimonides would say the identical)
task of avoiding tajsim, requires a lifetime of
study and reflection. One is constantly engaged
in a process of purifying one’s thoughts about
the divine.
Keskin and Yousefi: It is curious that,
historically speaking, many Jewish scholars
have taken a keen interest in studying various
aspects of Islamic civilization, whereas very few
Muslim scholars have actively engaged in the
examination of Jewish theological and
philosophical thought. How could we make
sense of this asymmetrical interest?

Dr. Langermann: I think that in large measure
this is due to the absence of any real tradition of
the humanities in Islamic cultures; I mean, the
evaluation of the study of other cultures, their
language, history, religions, arts, and so forth as
a worthwhile and valuable field of knowledge in
its own right. A work like al-Biruni's book on
India stands out, not only because of its
wonderful observations and insights, but also
because of the rarity of books of that sort.
Keskin and Yousefi: Do you think that Israeli
scholars, who work on Islamic Studies and
Islam, have any prejudice against Islam, or hold
Islamophobic attitudes?
Dr. Langermann: I am sure that some do. Don't
forget that Israel, like Turkey, has been ruled for
the most part by avowed secularists; some have
a fanatical revulsion towards all religions.
Keskin and Yousefi: Dr. Langermann, we
would like to ask you a question that is not
directly related with academia, but I think it is
important to elaborate on and understand the
problem that Jewish people have faced over
centuries in Europe. As a Muslim, over the last
thirty years, I think Muslims in general have
sometimes been accused of using anti-Semitic
overtones in their language when they criticize
Israeli foreign policies. However, I personally
believe that we must not mix two different
concepts; criticizing the Israeli Foreign Policy,
and racism/anti-Semitism. As a Jew, what is
your definition of racism/anti-Semitism, and
where do you think that Muslims should draw
the line between these two completely different
concepts? Do you think anti-Semitism exists in
Muslim populated societies the same way it
exists in Europe and America?
[6]
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Dr. Langermann: Well, that's a tall order.
Generally, I think there is a big difference
between speaking about, or criticizing, or
lambasting, "the Israelis" and doing the same to
"the Jews"; that's the main difference. Don't forget
that powerful elements in Israeli society and
politics reject the idea of a "Jewish state". I also
don't know exactly how to measure antiSemitism. I'm sure that if you polled some groups
of Muslims about their perceptions of Jews, you
would find a lot of negativity (that's an
Americanism, I'm not sure if it's in the dictionary).
However, just how all of this comes into play in
the public sphere is, at least I imagine it to be, a
different question, and certainly the more pressing
issue. I do want to end by saying that I've had a
wonderful experience teaching classes on Qura'n,
Sufism, and religious philosophy to classes where
Muslims range between one-third to two-thirds of
the participants; and I'm pleased that on the
whole, my Muslim students realize that I am a
believer, a muwahhid, and at least aim towards
ibada; and that means that we have in common the
most important beliefs. We all belong to ma'shar
al-muwahhidin.

Call for Papers:
Special Issue of the Sociology of Islam and Muslim
Societies Newsletter

Contemporary Iran: Politics, Society and Economy

The next issue will be published at the beginning of
October and we would like to publish your short articles,
and abstracts of your dissertation or research, and a book
review on Iranian politics, society and economy.
Those who would like to contribute can send us their
short articles or book reviews(1500-2000 words) by
October 1st.
Please send your submission to:
Najm al-Din Yousefi: nyousefi@vt.edu
and
Tugrul Keskin: tugrulk@pdx.edu

******************************************************************************
9th European Sociological Association Conference
European Society or European Societies?
September 2 - 5, 2009
Lisbon, Portugal
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The Islamicity of Different Interpretations of
HIJĀB

in four basic orientations:
traditionalist,
secularist, fundamentalist, and contextualist.

By Rachel Woodlock

Traditionalists

Introduction

For those who we might call traditionalists (or
perhaps better neo-traditionalists given the
ubiquitous nature of modernity) and who follow
traditional jurisprudence as it developed over the
course of many centuries from around the second/
third century AH, face-veiling for women is
considered not only permissible, but in some
opinions compulsory in public. In the pre-Islamic
period, free women (and occasionally free men)
veiled their faces as a signal of their status
(Stillman 2003, 20–21). This was carried into the
Islamic era, and a mutually reinforcing spiral was
generated between the sartorial customs of early
Muslim cultures and the opinions of religious
lawyers generating interpretations of sacred law.
Examples of the prerequisite of face-veiling for
women include opinions related in the Ḥanafī fiqh
text Heavenly Ornaments (Thanwi 2004, 328) and
the Shāfi‘ī Reliance of the Traveller (Keller 1999,
512) both of which have been translated into
English in recent times. Nevertheless, important
classical jurists who gave opinions permitting the
face, hands and/or feet to remain exposed include
Abū Ḥanīfah and al-Ṭabārī. For today’s
traditionalists, body and/or face veiling are
authentic Islamic practices because they accept as
authoritative Islamic female dress as it was
conceived in classical jurisprudence.

On a recent holiday to Bali, I moved amongst the
island’s population wearing my customary cotton
headscarf and loose, long-sleeved dress I had
adopted upon my conversion to Islam over a
decade before. Seeing a white Australian Muslim
woman evoked surprised reactions from locals
and for those bold enough to ask questions,
repeated explanations about my Muslim identity.
The only marker of difference that distinguished
me from the hundreds of other Australian visitors
was my Islamic dress; had I not been wearing a
headscarf, I would have attracted little attention
outside the normal tourist experience. As a white
woman wearing Islamic dress, I carried with me
all the contradictory symbols and meanings of
Islamic female dress, referred to colloquially as
ḥijāb. As Franks (2000, 918) argues: “the power
relations with which it is associated are situated
not only in the meaning with which it is invested
but also in the circumstances under which it is
worn.” As well, women wearing Islamic female
dress (however interpreted) are performing a
religious act, even if it has other cultural,
sociological and political implications. Thus, the
question of who has the right and authority to
interpret religious dress is part of a wider debate
over religious authority generally, where women’s
bodies have become the contested battle-ground
for Islamic authenticity and identity (Yeğenoğlu
1998, 99; Werbner 2007, 162; Mir-Hosseini 2007,
90–91).
Based on a simplified version of
Abdullah Saeed’s (2007) taxonomy this article
looks at the discourse surrounding ḥijāb offered

Secularists
For secularists, female veiling practices are
associated with backwardness, misogyny, and the
undesirable imposition of patriarchal religion
intruding in public life. With contradictory
arguments, secularists have asserted the ḥijāb
[8]
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represents both the passive oppression of women
as victims, and the aggressive assertion of
religion in the public sphere (Werbner 2007;
Scott 2005), whilst denying any other symbols or
meanings for Muslim female dress. Westerneducated sociologist Fatema Mernissi views the
ḥijāb as a cloth prison imposed to remove
women’s agency and voice: “veils hide only what
is obscene” (Mernissi 1993, 179). She argues the
imposition of ḥijāb—the moment in Prophetic
history where the apartments of the wives were
veiled by a curtain that spelled their privatisation
—marked a retreat from an original
egalitarianism taught by the Prophet, who was
forced to compromise by the overpowering
patriarchy of the community (Mernissi 1991,
106–14, 178–79, 185). Mernissi spends a great
deal of time attempting to present the ḥijāb—
conflated to mean both the privatisation of the
Prophet’s wives and Muslim women’s dress—as
inauthentic to the Prophet’s true message.

(mostly those of the Wahhābī-Salafī persuasion)
require that for the woman, the entire body be
covered with an opaque, loose, flowing outer
cloak or wrap that starts from the head. The face
must be covered, either with this garment, or with
a separate piece of affixed material, often referred
to colloquially as niqāb “mask, face-veil” (AlMunajjid 1997–2008). Other fundamentalists
(such as the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Jamā‘a
al-Islāmiyah) give permission for Muslim women
to leave the face and hands uncovered, but
require loose, opaque clothing that covers the
body, usually some sort of coat or dress, coupled
with a headscarf pinned or tied so that it that
covers the ears and neck, draping down onto the
shoulders and/or chest. This is a new type of
Islamic dress, referred to by fundamentalists as
al-ziyy al-Islāmī “Islamic attire” or al-ziyy alshar‘ī (sharī‘ah attire) (El Guindi 1999, 134;
Stillman 2003, 158).
Contextualists

Fundamentalists
Fundamentalists claim to resurrect the original
teachings of Islam that have been neglected or
masked by incorporation of un-Islamic
innovations. They do this through a pragmatic,
selective retrieval of past doctrines (Marty and
Appleby 1993, 3). The discourse about Islamic
female dress is one of the most important
symbols and boundary markers of Muslim
identity for fundamentalists. The ḥijāb in their
discourse is removed from any notion of cultural
traditional Islamic dress, and fundamentalists
have sought to elucidate an objective singular
truth on what ḥijāb means for all Muslim women,
everywhere. Although proposing a definitive
interpretation, in practice fundamentalists differ
on what they define as proper ḥijāb. Some

Contextualists are Muslims who argue that Islam
—and in particular religious law—must be
understood contextually (Esack 2005, 142–44).
That is, Muslims have always interpreted religion
through the paradigmatic lense of particular timeperiods, places, cultures, language-groups and
classes. Because of this, Muslims developed rich
and varied interpretations of Islamic belief and
practice, unified around the core doctrines of
monotheism and the prophethood of Muhammad.
They assert the right to perform ijtihād.
Contextualists come from the modernist school of
thought that arose in the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries (for example see Fazlur
Rahman’s methodology for interpreting Islam in
Rahman 1982, 2–11; Sonn 1991, 213–14; Saeed
2006a, 42–43).
[9]
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Contextualists vary as to their interpretations of
Islamic dress, but generally speaking they
approach the question by emphasising that a)
Islam teaches modesty for men and women, and
b) individuals and societies may have different
interpretations of what constitutes modesty.
(Women Living Under Muslim Laws 1997, 201–
226). “The law of modesty in the Qurʼan applies
to men and women both and applies to them
equally. … You have to interpret the Islamic law
of modesty, a) according to your own conscience
and b) according to your cultural context. What is
modest in one society is not modest in another
society and so on” (215).
Conclusion
Different types of Muslims provide different
answers to the question of what constitutes
appropriate Islamic dress, because they have
different ways of approaching the interpretation of
religion. Traditionalists acknowledge as their
source of authority, the received interpretations
and rulings of religious law that developed over
many centuries. Secularists promote Western-style
models of the separation of religion and state and
the privatisation of religion. Fundamentalists’
source of authority lies in the search for a
singular, definitive interpretation of God’s will.
Lastly, contextualists assert the right of
individuals (including women) to interpret
religion as appropriate for particular times,
cultures and contexts.
Rachel Woodlock, Researcher and Doctoral Candidate at Centre
for Islam and the Modern World and the Global Terrorism
Research Centre Monash University, Caulfield Ph: +61399034304
Fax: +61399034686 Email: Rachel.Woodlock@arts.monash.edu.au
I use the label fundamentalist with some caution, as it is a hotly
contested term. In this paper, it is used in the sense given in The
Fundamentalism Project (Marty and Appleby 1991).
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Representation of Islam and Muslims by the
British Government Between 2001 and 2007
By Leon Moosavi
Introduction
A great suspicion of Islam and Muslims in social
and political discussions has led to recognition
that Islamophobia is widespread in Britain
(Abbas 2006: xv, The Runnymede Trust 1997).
Perhaps the major concern about Islamophobia is
that it is “prevalent in all sections of our society”
and “part of the fabric of everyday life in modern
Britain” (The Runnymede Trust 1997: 1, 11).
This extends to the political elite, as it has been
noted that “Islamophobia reaches all the way up
to the highest levels of government” (Cesari
2004b: 41). In the same breath, it has been
argued that the ‘War on Terror’ and other
Governmental responses to 9/11 and 7/7 have
increased the acceptability of Islamophobia
(Allen & Nielsen 2002: 53). This article – which
is based on my MA dissertation – is concerned
with the ways in which Muslims and Islam have
been conveyed in speeches by British Cabinet
Ministers of the Labour Government as one of
the various ways in which Islamophobia
crystallises.
It is important to challenge those representations
which are considered to be contradictory,
stereotypical
or
inaccurate
as
these
representations can be accepted as ‘truths’,
leading to real life effects in the form of
discrimination. Prejudices are generally assumed
to be confined to those with less education and
less ‘cultural capital’ than those in the highest
echelon of society. Indeed, one commentator has
described how “subtle forms [of Islamophobia]
amongst the educated and well-placed elite are
well-entrenched and proportionately more
dangerous. …[as] the elite formulates and

disseminates racism to the grassroots, where it
becomes more explicit and violent” (Malik
2004b: 9). Aside from their influence on policy
and legislation, ministers are extremely
influential within the media and setting the
agenda of national debates. In total, 111 speeches
from 16 different Cabinet Ministers between
2001 and 2007 were analysed. Due to limited
space, I will only briefly share two themes that
were explored in the dissertation.
‘The True Muslims’ and ‘The Real Islam’
The Government considers itself to have
authority in intervening with theological matters
by claiming who is a ‘true Muslim’ and what the
‘real Islam’ is. There was often distinctions made
between different types of Muslims. The ‘good
Muslims’ were often described as the
“moderate” ones. For instance, Gordon Brown
called for “partnership with moderate Muslims
and moderates everywhere” (Brown 2006b).
This moderate Islam is supposedly characterised
by being peaceful, non-violent, tolerant,
respectful and loving. So for example, Tony
Blair claimed, “The doctrine and teachings of
Islam are those of peace and harmony. … It is a
whole teaching dedicated to building peace in
the world” (Blair 2001b).
One
manifestation
of
promoting
this
‘secularised’ Islam is that it is intended to be
more personal and practiced behind closed doors
to the extent where any Muslim who allows their
Islamic beliefs to influence their political activity
in the public sphere is considered extreme
(Malik 2004b: 13-14). This was emphasised in
the ministers’ speeches by the constant reference
directly to Islam as a “faith” which holds
connotations of personal belief rather than as a
‘way of life’ which is how Islam is typically
defined by Muslims themselves.
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It is hypothesised by some that these
constructions of Islam are to serve political
purposes, mainly in making Islam more passive
by weakening the ideological resistance that
Islamic sources can accommodate for through
emphasising Islam’s spiritual dimension and
reducing its political and social dimensions
(Ameli et al. 2007: 24). It has been argued that
the brand of Islam that most matches the
Government’s requirements is Sufism which is
often presented as the most secularised and
passive form of Islam (Cesari 2004b: 50-51,).
Ruth Kelly expressed the Government’s desire
to work specifically with Sufis by saying “[w]e
need to always ask ourselves whether we are
working with the right groups in the right
way. Organisations such as the Sufi Muslim
Council are an important part of that
work” (Kelly 2006b). So for example, when
the Muslim Council of Britain criticised the
‘War on Terror’ “[t]he State looked instead to
the Sufi Muslim Council as a replacement, not
because it represented the majority sect among
British Muslims, but because it was perceived
as supportive of the government’s foreign
policy” (Kundnani 2007: 182).

Ministers even went as far to say that they
wanted to unite with and empower ‘moderate’
Muslims to outcast and isolate those nonconformist Muslims they consider extreme
(Blair 2001b, Blears 2006), For example,
Brown said “we must take steps to isolate
extremists
from
the
moderate
majority” (Brown 2006b), and despite saying
“extremists are explicitly and continuously
trying to divide and rule, to drive wedges
between
nations
and
between
peoples” (Beckett 2006), Margaret Beckett still
pushes to “mobilise the vast moderate, majority
and push the extremists to the fringe where
they belong” (Beckett 2006).
The Government does not hide the fact that it is
engaged in promoting specific types of Islam.
There is often talk about how it is funding and
working with specifically hand-picked Muslim
scholars and Muslims organisations to promote
a certain version of Islam as well as
encouraging mosques to engage in certain
activities and giving specific syallabi to Islamic
schools for them to teach (Blair 2004c,Blears
2006). For example, Blair has admitted that
“one of the things that we are looking at is how
you make sure that there is a certain set of
agreed rules and guidelines as to how any faith
school should teach its own faith” (Blair
2005e) and elsewhere confessed that he has
used certain Muslims to promote a specific
version of Islam (Blair 2006c).

Following the line of identifying ‘the real
Muslims’ and ‘the true Islam’, those who
committed terrorism or were considered
extreme were said to be abusing Islam and
twisting its ‘real’ teachings. For example, Blair
said that “the extremists that threaten violence
are not true Muslims in the sense of being true
to the proper teaching of Islam” (Blair 2006i).
Therefore, it is clear that the discourse does not
reject Muslims and Islam per se, but specific
variations of them. That some Muslims are
worth accommodating is justified in the
repeated argument that Muslims have
contributed a great deal to British society.

The idea that there is a ‘real Islam’ is not only
promulgated by the Government though. In
fact, there is increasing debates amongst
Muslims themselves about who has the right to
call themselves a Muslim and what the true
Islamic teachings are. Therefore, it has to be
accepted that Muslims do – and always will –
interpret their religion in a multitude of
ways .
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Muslims as Monolithic
The constructions of one ‘true Islam’ is based on
one general assumption, which is that Muslims
can be categorised into one uniform group.
Indeed, one prominent stereotype of Islam and
Muslims is that they are static and monolithic,
unable to change, evolve or accommodate
diversity (Bayart 2005: 242-243, Kalin 2004:
143, 166). This stereotype of Muslims as
monolithic has been rejected by many who have
commented on the huge diversity of Muslims
around the world, including within Britain.
Muslims are individuals with unique
characteristics and identities, and therefore to
attribute them to be part of one monolithic
community just because they are Muslim limits
them as individuals.
There was a conscious effort by Government
Ministers to abandon any construction of
Muslims as monolithic which is clearly evident
in comments such as by Tony Blair who said,
“Islam is not a monolithic faith, but one made
up of a rich pattern of diversity” (Blair 2007b)
or by Jack Straw who said “Geographically,
Islam is spread across the six continents – and it
is equally diverse theologically, socially and
politically” (Straw 2005f) In some cases an
effort was made to recognise there is not one
Muslim community, but in fact “Muslim
communities” in the plural (Beckett 2006, Blair
2001c). Such statements, nonetheless, restrict
Muslims into smaller segmented communities
assuming they all embody a certain feature.

frequently falls short” (The Runnymede Trust
1997: 1). The analysis in this paper agrees with
this conclusion. Islamophobia based on
assumptions, stereotypes and inferences were
commonly
identified.
The
negative
representations of Muslims and Islam can lead
to Muslims experiencing prejudice and
discrimination in their everyday lives. Thus,
these
Islamophobic
representations
demonstrated by the Ministers - many of whom
continue to hold positions in Prime Minister
Gordon Brown’s cabinet - must be challenged.
Finally, this discussion can be aptly summarised
by a quote from the former Prime Minister of
Britain, Tony Blair, who recently recognised
that “there is huge and profound ignorance
about Islam” (Blair 2007b).
The bibliography is available on request but was
omitted here due to its size.
PhD Student , Sociology Department ,
Lancaster University,
l.moosavi@lancaster.ac.uk
He is currently working on conversion to
Islam
If you would like a copy of the full
dissertation, which has full quotes from
Ministers’ speeches, please email me.
Due to space limitation, reference to only a
few speeches is included in this paper,
although a larger volume of references have
been gathered.

Conclusion
The seminal report that introduced the severity
of Islamophobia in Britain explained that “[t]he
UK Government’s official stance [towards
Muslims] is one of welcome and inclusion. …It
is a fine aspiration. The reality however
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Scholarly Research in the Madrassa: A Brief
Overview
By Maulana Waris Mazhari
(Translated by Yoginder Sikand)
Some days ago, I had the chance to meet a
leading Islamic scholar, an author of several
books. During our conversation he remarked
that the biggest and most influential Madrassa
in India had, in the last thirty years or so,
produced only two well-researched books. This,
he said, was evidence of the pathetic state of
scholarship characteristic of the vast majority of
the Indian Madrassa today.
While in the past our Madrassa produced
numerous scholars, today this is hardly the case
at all. Today, most Madrassa restrict themselves
only to the teaching of what is specified in their
curriculum. In most cases, the only extracurricular activity that they provide for their
students is training them to deliver emotiondriven speeches. Not surprisingly, then, almost
all Madrassa graduates become either teachers
or orators. Some of them earn their bread by
penning tracts, whose only purpose is to foment
sectarian strife. Very few Madrassa graduates
actually go on to do any serious scholarly
research at all. Shockingly, even those men who
spend years teaching voluminous tomes on
Hadith, Fiqh and Qur’anic commentary for
years on end in the Madrassa often only pen a
few tracts of a very elementary sort or a
commentary on some basic text book and
consider this to be a great scholarly
contribution! And their sycophantic students
and other followers are ever ready to convince

them of the supposed great intellectual
contributions that they have made thereby!
It is an undeniable fact that expansion of the
frontiers of knowledge, even with regard to
religion, is now no longer happening in the
Madrassa. If at all this is happening, it is outside
the Madrassas—in institutes, universities and
private intellectual circles. This is so not just in
India alone but throughout the rest of South
Asia. The intellectual stagnation in our
Madrassas can be exemplified with the help of a
single instance. Almost all the Sunni ulema
groups in South Asia claim to be heirs of the
intellectual legacy of Shah Waliullah Dehlavi,
the influential eighteenth century Indian scholar,
but besides his Hujjat al-Balagha, no other of
his many works is taught in the Madrassas or
has been published by them. And today
conferences about Shah Waliullah and his
legacy are being held at universities in Delhi
and Aligarh, not in the Madrassas in Deoband
and Lucknow.
Interesting and new, well-researched scholarly
Islamic texts are being produced by some
Muslim academies in Delhi. But nothing of this
sort comes out of the hundreds of publishing
houses associated with Madrassas across the
country. Scores of journals and magazines are
published by Madrassas throughout India, but
most of these are of a very poor standard in
terms of intellectual output. They lack
originality, focus on hypothetical and theoretical
issues as against practical realities, are overly
preachy and normative and very often are
geared to fanning sectarian conflicts and hatred.
The main reason for this pathetic state of affairs
is, undoubtedly, the narrow mindedness of the
majority of our ulema and Madrassa students.
This is related to the fact that they have
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restricted the work of Madrassas to what they
see as guiding people on issues of day-to-day
concern in matters of ritual, practice and belief
and the preservation of what is generally
considered to be ‘Islamic’ culture. In this way
have cut themselves off from the wider world.
But, the question arises, what is the need for
students to spend eight long years, studying
numerous different subjects, if this is what the
Madrassas are training them for? A course of a
much shorter duration, of say three years or so,
would suffice for this purpose.
Another factor for the poor standards of
scholarship and research in Madrassas today is
the almost total lack of any collaboration
between Madrassas and other academic
institutions, which could have helped Madrassas
improve their scholarly output. In fact, the
relationship between the two sets of institutions
is characterized by considerable mutual hostility
and suspicion. It is also a fact that the wrong
notion of a divide between ‘religious’ and
‘worldly’ knowledge that is constantly stressed
by the Madrassas has played a major role in this
furthering the division between Madrassas and
‘secular’ institutions.
A third factor for this lamentable state of affairs
is that certain families control the vast majority
of Madrassas. They have become, in essence,
family-run affairs. This is the ‘mother of all
illnesses’, in my humble opinion. It has resulted
in the complete absence of democratic
functioning in the Madrassas, in their
commercialization and in the exploitation of
their employees, all of which have had an
extremely deleterious impact on the Madrassas
and their scholarly environment. The monopoly
that certain individuals or families exercise over
the Madrassas is often reflected in the sort of

literature that they bring out—much of it being
pure propaganda, in the form of hagiographies,
heaping praise on the founders of their
respective institutions and the ulema associated
with their sects.
A fourth factor for the deplorable state of
scholarship and research in the Madrassas is
their extremely restricted syllabus, which has
made for the ulema to remain confined within
the four walls of their Madrassas and to have
little or no knowledge of the rapid changes
happening in the world around them. This is
reflected in the sort of publications that the
Madrassas and the ulema churn out, many of
which have no social relevance at all or else
lack any originality.
A fifth factor is economic. There are
undoubtedly many capable students and
teachers in the Madrassas, who, if given the
facilities and necessary support, can engage in
fruitful scholarly research. However, Madrassas
make no arrangement for financing this sort of
research work. What generally happens, instead,
is that some maulvis take to making money and
winning cheap popularity through penning
emotionally-driven, and often fiercely sectarian,
books of low scholarly standard. They seem to
enjoy a mutually beneficial relationship with
certain publishing houses affiliated with their
own sects. These publishing houses specialize in
producing this sort of literature, which rakes in
handsome profits for their owners as well as for
those who pen these books.
A sixth factor for the virtual absence of any
creative scholarly work in the Madrassas is that
very few of them have any special departments
for research and publications. Most of the few
Madrassas that do have such departments lack
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qualified people to staff them. It is very difficult,
if not impossible, for creative, independentminded thinkers and scholars to adjust to the
closed and insular environment of the Madrassa.
Seventhly, the fact that the vast majority of
Madrassa graduates have expertise in just one
language (Urdu, in north India), with little or no
familiarity with English greatly limits their
potential as researchers and scholars. Most
Madrassa graduates do not even know proper
Arabic despite having spent many years
ostensibly studying that language.
What Should Be Done?
Intellectual work on a large scale cannot depend
simply on the efforts and initiative of individual
scholars. Rather, community-based organizations
have to create funds and provide facilities to
encourage scholars. But this is completely
lacking in the case of the Madrassas. In the past,
Muslim rulers and nobles generously patronized
Madrassa-based scholars. In the West today, huge
research foundations like the Ford Foundation
and the Carnegie Foundation provide research
projects to scholars. Sadly, there are virtually no
Muslim organizations that promote this sort of
work. At least the larger and well-funded
Madrassas ought to arrange for separate budgets
for research projects that can be assigned to
selected scholars to work on.
Improving the standard of scholarship in the
Madrassas is inextricably linked to the issue of
widening their focus so that they see their task
not simply as teaching students a set of texts or
expanding their stock of knowledge but also
widening their thought and mental horizons.
Intellectual development can only happen in an
environment that promotes, rather than
discourages, curiosity. Sadly, this is totally absent

in the Madrassas. Further, Madrassas make little
or no provision for teaching social sciences and
various languages, without which the sort of
creative research that one hopes for cannot be
produced. I think Madrassas must include
English as a compulsory subject in their
curriculum, and, perhaps through open
universities or the Maulana Azad National Urdu
University in Hyderabad, arrange for their
students to learn various social sciences. In the
absence of this it is doubtful if the Madrassas can
at all engage in any sort of creative and relevant
research and scholarly work.
I would also suggest that all big Madrassas set up
research centers and academies. Some Madrassas
already have such institutions, but, sadly, most of
these exist just in name and only for show,
bringing out literature glorifying their founders or
fanning sectarian hatred and strife. Madrassas
must also expand their range of extra-curricular
activities in order to encourage students to take
greater interest in research work. They can
arrange for experts in different subjects (and not
just those narrowly defined as ‘religious’) to
deliver regular lectures to their students. They
can organize regular essay-writing competitions
and debates for students. They must also arrange
for their libraries to stock important journals and
books, including on contemporary social issues
and developments. They can provide students
with training in writing skills and journalism, and
arrange for selected students’ essays on issues of
contemporary concern to be published in
Madrassa journals or as edited volumes that can
be made available to the public. Final year
students must be made to write full-length
research-based dissertations. This will help
improve their writing and analytical skills besides
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adding to the scholarly output of the Madrassas.
Dissertations of good standard, especially if they
represent new and creative thinking, can also be
published in the form of books so that the
general public can access them. Bigger
Madrassas can also encourage scholarly work by
organizing annual seminars on topics of current
interest and contemporary import.
Madrassas can also arrange for their staff and
senior students to visit other Madrassas, and even
institutions of learning run by non-Muslims, so
as to benefit from them. In this regard some of
the larger Madrassas can also consider sending
some of their capable students who are firm in
their faith to the top institutions of religious
learning in the West. These students can play a
major and vital role in providing scholarly
responses from an Islamic point of view to
present-day global challenges.
These are some suggestions for addressing the
pathetic state of scholarship that characterizes
our Madrassas today. In this regard I believe the
major hurdle that we face is the misplaced sense
that the Madrassas have of their supposed selfsufficiency, their reluctance to introspect, their
feeling that all is right with them and that there is
no room for improvement at all. Obviously, this
attitude is hardly conducive to intellectual
development and the thirst for broadening and
deepening their intellectual horizons.
Since the malaise of poor standards of
scholarship in the Madrassas is deep-seated and a
result of many factors, obviously it cannot be
solved at once. For this to change, Madrassas
need to critically and realistically examine their
present curriculum and system. Only then can
they become centers of scholarly activity and
creative thought and research—as were
Madrassas centuries ago—and in this way prove

beneficial not just to Muslims alone but to
humankind in general. Or else, this complaint of
the poet Muhammad Iqbal will continue to haunt
them:
Neither life, nor love. Neither realization, nor
vision.
Maulana Waris Mazhari, a graduate of the Dar
ul-Uloom at Deoband, is the editor of the Delhibased Tarjuman Dar ul-Uloom, the official organ
of the Deoband Graduates' Association. He can
be contacted on w.mazhari@gmail.com

*********************************
Shah Mahmoud Hanifi’s lecture on the US
Foreign Policy and Afghanistan: The Colonial
Market for Afghan Languages
by Lindsay N. Meath
Sophomore in Marketing Management at
Virginia Tech
lmeath@vt.edu
This lecture was more about the language in
Afghanistan throughout its history than what I
thought it would be about, which was the market
for Afghan languages. There was discussion on
this fascinating market for a language that
Americans tend to associate with negative
thoughts, but the core of this lecture was on the
history of Afghan languages and how they lead
to explain the current market. Professor Shah
Mahmoud Hanifi from James Madison
University started his lecture by introducing his
book, “Colonial Market for Afghan Languages”.
During colonialism
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in India the British handled some languages well,
and others not so well, resulting in hundreds of
neglected and lost languages throughout this period.
Modern day Afghanistan was brought into existence
primarily because of the British India Colonialism.
The two primary languages in Afghanistan today
are Dari and Pashto. The main language that
Professor Hanifi focused on was Pashto. Pashto is
associated with the boundary between Pakistan and
Afghanistan, and the market for spoken Pashto is
about $210,000 in a single year. Historically
Afghanistan has been pulled by the South with the
Indian Ocean, and the North with the Silk Road.
When I say “pulled”, this means that the
geographical North and South locations culturally
pulled on Afghan society. These “pulls”, natural
because of Afghan’s location, have affected
Afghanistan for hundreds of years. This affected
language because people learned mobility with
these geographical and cultural pulls. Languages
ultimately ended up interacting, combining,
becoming lost, and new ones were created
throughout the history of Afghanistan; primarily the
cause of this is the mobility throughout the region.
Mobility throughout the region has always made it
hard to pinpoint identities to certain areas. This may
lead into a possible foreign policy issue. Since
historical, cultural, and geographical influences
have had extreme effects on Afghanistan, the
different languages are now widespread and have
dispersed throughout a huge region. Ultimately,
there is no way for someone to identify a particular
type of people in a particular section. Which is why
US foreign policy officials may find this fact
frustrating in foreign affairs with Afghanistan. The
effect that mobility has had on Afghan languages is
a topic that most Americans are not knowledgeable
about, because the history about these languages is
not one of particular interest to our society.

Hanifi then went on to explain more of Pashto,
and shed light onto the language that so little
Americans seem to give a second thought about.
Pashto is primarily a rural language that gets
trumped by the state bureaucratic language,
Persian. Persian is a language of bureaucracies
and government in the entire Middle East region.
Several theories about where Pashto comes from
have been brought up, most attributing the
creation of the language to the influences and
combinations of other languages. Hanifi
introduced H.G. Raverty, a very important name
in the study of Pashto to this day. Raverty was a
man who studied Pashto and published
documents, books, and dictionaries on this
language. If one were to look up Raverty’s name
they would primarily find books that he has
written about how to learn Pashto. Born in 1825,
Raverty wasn’t born long after the earliest
printings of Pashto. The earliest printings of
Pashto were in the early 1800’s, and today there
are different types of production used to print
Pashto. A main use to print Pashto, present day,
is for Shab Namaha, or night lettering. These
documents are generally threatening and
combine Pashto and Persia. This introduces the
most serious interest of foreign policies and
affairs with Pashto. The US government shows
this interest in the public market for Pashto. The
US government has created the DLI, Defense
Language Institute, for military purposes to study
the language of Pashto. The DLI is the
representative of the public market for Pashto.
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However, the real money making market, with
the annual income of $210,000, comes from the
private market of subcontracted work. This
subcontracted work is usually done for the
government by highly specialized experts.
Overall, Hanifi explains in detail how he has
studied languages in Afghanistan, Pashto being
the major focus. This language has been
affected over an extended period of time by
cultural and geographical influences, and it
extends into the interest of the US market and
foreign policy.
This lecture, even though I did not go into detail
that US foreign policy plays a role with Pashto,
was extremely interesting and the US foreign
policy peaked my interest. The fact that the
reason there is a market for Pashto today seems
to come from the interaction between the US
and Afghanistan. The history of this language is
so complex and the actual origins are extremely
difficult to figure out, and even how to print or
speak it may be difficult for people to
understand. This shows that language plays a
vital role in understanding people in a foreign
place that don’t seem to speak a mainstream
language. Most militaries are not going to think
of the complexities of a language when dealing
with foreign affairs. Primarily they will focus on
hiring translators and personnel who specialize
in the particular language in the region. I almost
wish I could watch military personnel attempt to
communicate with people who speak Pashto,
because this language is not a straightforward
simple language. Translators and specialists can
be hired, but what the military and government
will soon find out is that even those highly

specialized experts will have a tough time
translating and interpreting. Pashto is sometimes
combined with other languages, like in the night
letters that Afghan groups use. The US
government and military are aware of this and
therefore try to implement ways to help
specialists learn more, most likely the reason for
the DLI. My reaction to the night letters was one
of immediate interest. Groups combine these
two prominent languages in Afghanistan to
threaten people across the nation, at least the
majority of the time they are threatening. How
can the US government and military possibly
figure out the Persian and Pashto combination
and then figure out where it originates? Even
with the DLI this is extremely difficult, because
no one can find true, reliable roots to Pashto.
Hanifi explained that these letters are printed,
photocopied, and handwritten, and to have a
printer of some sort that prints numerous
amounts of letters written in Pashto seemed to
confuse Hanifi. This was particularly interesting
because when a person in the room asked how
the groups did all this printing, Hanifi, an expert
it seems at the language in Afghanistan and its
history, was confused at how they could manage
this with such a complicated language. Now
Pashto is not only a challenging language with
its history of the past and cultural influence in
the region today, but it is also a tremendously
difficult language to produce on paper. It is
difficult to produce due to the lettering and
symbols that the language incorporates, and the
fact that it is a language of no interest to the
Afghan government. Also, since the government
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trumps this language and speaks Dari instead,
they are not going to spend their time figuring
out how to find someone truly capable of
mastering the mass printing process of Pashto.
Yet, if this mass production of Pashto confuses
or stumps Hanifi, then surely the US military
becomes stumped as well. Pashto is spoken in
rural areas, but also in threatening letters that
are of particular interest to our government.
Pashto, or any other language in Afghanistan for
that matter, was never of any interest to our
government, military, or other various people in
the United States. Now, it appears to me, from
this lecture, that all of these languages of
Afghanistan have suddenly become a very
significant interest to all of the previous people
listed, because of US foreign policy concerns
and the interactions occurring between
Afghanistan and the United States. Pashto is
perhaps one of the most complicated hurdles
that experts, the US government, researchers,
and the US military have ever faced culturally
due to the amount of unknown information that
all leads back to how this language came about
in the first place.
*Shah Mahmoud Hanifi (Assistant Professor,
B.A. University of Wisconsin-Madison, Ph.D.
University of Michigan) teaches courses on the
history of the modern Middle East and South
Asia in the History Department and in the
General Education Program. He is the
Coordinator of the Interdisciplinary Minor in
Middle Eastern Communities and Migrations.
His recent book titles “Connecting Histories in
Afghanistan” published by Columbia University
Press.

******************************

The Clash of Modernities: The Islamist
Challenge and the Making and Unmaking
of the “New” Jew, Arab, and Turk. Paradigm
Publishers: Boulder, CO (July 2009)
Khaldoun Samman
For some two centuries now many of us have
imagined global diversity ranging along a
historically hierarchical trajectory, as though it
were a sloped, ever-ascending mass movement
of humanity where cultures, although existing
side-by-side at the very same moment, could be
located at different points of time. By simply
cruising the world, we could see not only
humanity’s great cultural diversity but its
historical as well. It is as though H.G. Wells had
really invented his time machine allowing us, as
we travel across the world’s different cultural
landscape, to visit places of far-away time.
Americans can cross their southern border and
visit their “distant neighbor,” as one book’s title
advertizes.Or we could visit, as a travel
promotional brochure claims, Morocco and
encounter, on camel back, “ancient ruins” and
an “age-old culture” where “life is much as it
was centuries ago.” We could, at this very
moment, for instance, stand in Manhattan, look
towards Iran, and declare, because it is ruled by
Mullahs, that it is “still feudal” and “stuck” in
the fourteenth-century, with the slightest hint in
the irony of such a claim. We do, of course,
realize that Mexico, Morocco, and Iran are all
here in our very presence. But because of the
dominance of a linear temporal perspective
which separates “societies” as containing their
own space and time, this time-like travel myth
has now continued for several centuries, and we
have now become accustomed to see cultures or
civilizations as possessing their own launching
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pads with some unable to even ignite their
engines while others are deep into the way
yonder. In this sense, our minds have been
colonized by a nineteenth-century, if not earlier,
dogma that there exists a linear historical
progress to which all “societies,” although at
radically different speeds and at varying points,
have traveled through. Some may “still” be at a
“traditional” or agricultural/rural phase, while
others are “nearer” to modernity, living in the
Middle ages or feudal-like societies, but as soon
as “they” get their true renaissance or religious
and secular reformers—their equivalents of
“our” philosophes and Luthers—they too can
join the more “advanced” societies.
This book argues that this temporal lens, with its
peculiar epistemological ways of seeing the
world of difference, was only slightly revised in
the hands of the colonized, with much of it
being accommodated by the political and
intellectual elites—both secular and Islamists
alike. While the colonizer constructed this
historical imagination in their desire to dominate
the global south, so as to make it appear that
their rule over the natives was a natural result of
history’s call for the realization of rationality,
the Spirit, democracy, the liberation of women,
or human rights, the colonized scrambled to renarrate this very same discourse so as to place
themselves as the vanguards for the
emancipation of their societies. By removing the
colonizers from their midst and replacing them
with “indigenous” leaders who have the best
interest of their people in mind, they will be
well-positioned, so they claimed, to deliver their
societies—which they admit are “still” in the
grips of a stagnant mentality—to this glorious
future.

This is what I call the colonizer’s temporal
template, a way of seeing time and the Other
that will have a tremendous impact on the way
the colonized, in their attempt to emancipate
themselves from the colonizer, understood
social change and progress, leading them to
think that the only way they could join
modernity is through massive cultural, political,
and technological overhaul of their societies. In
this book we will compare three different kinds
of responses to this colonizer’s gaze in the
Middle East, in which the colonizer’s time of
the Other was strategically revised in a number
of ways, yet remaining loyal to it as well.
Kemalism and Zionism, in their efforts to push
“their people” forward in time accepted the
narrative almost wholeheartedly, and proceeded
to eradicate what they perceived as “archaic”
characteristics of their Jewish and Turkish
cultures, while Arab Nationalists, in a similar
desire to get their people to “catch up” to the
West, negotiated a more cultural schizophrenic
approach on how to appease the colonizer’s
gaze. But so too, as the book investigates, did
the Islamists, who likewise wanted to improve
their societies, but in order to move forward in
time they prescribed the eradication of Western
contamination and reintroduced the prophetic
stage that they believe, if it weren’t corrupted
and just had been left alone and remained true to
itself—and if the colonizer and their local Arab
co-conspirators didn’t intervene with their toxic
morality—would have produced true
civilization. In this since they all shared the
same episteme that the colonizer delivered to
the region in the nineteenth century. The
colonizers insistence on essentializing their
difference between themselves and the Other
was based on a temporalized script, a script
whose intention was to distantiate the the Arab
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and Muslim spatially and temporally from their
Western self. Colonial difference, therefore,
legitimized the subordination of the global south
to colonial rule by positing the colonized—
sometimes in a biological and at other times in a
cultural evolutionary framework—as too
immature for self rule. Representing the Other
as living in tents, herding goats, riding camels,
and living in a nomadic and Bedouin
“premodern” lifestyle was part and parcel of
placing the Arab into a time narrative that made
him or her appear as belonging to an earlier Age
of Man. Of course, some of these constructs
were of a romantic sort, where Western
Orientalists, feeling entrapped in an ugly
industrialized urban zones of polluted areas like
that of late 19th century Manchester England,
dreamt of the “noble savage” who lived free and
in the wild. Yet no matter what the intentions
were, romantic or strictly utilitarian in nature,
the effect in either case created a temporal trope
around which the Arab’s culture and civilization
were understood. Moreover, the effects were
exceptionally productive in that by positing this
difference the colonized would likewise insist
on maintaining this script, but only after
removing the colonizer and replacing him with
the modern (male) nationalist who himself has
matured from his child-like Bedouin past.
The perceived backwardness of the Muslim
people when compared to the West, mixed with
the feeling of being humiliated by an occupying
foreign force, made it all that more necessary to
claim a sphere which they could use to inspire
their scarred dignity. This book, in its theoretical
contribution to the literature on nationalist and
Islamist movements in the Middle East, follows
the lead of Partha Chatterjee’s analysis of Indian
nationalism. But while Chatterjee’s creative

scholarly intervention was not all that useful in
analyzing Kemalism and Zionism, his work
proved to be highly applicable to Arab
nationalism. Given the fact that Arab
nationalists were deeply in awe with the culture
and power of the West, they devised a way to
reproduce the colonizer’s cultural and temporal
script by acknowledging the latter’s scientific
and technological superiority, and proceeded to
emulate those things that they understood as
universal items of modernity, things like
statecraft, economy, and science. However,
emulating this exterior material domain
produced in them a desire to create a spiritual
interior domain that they could call all their
own, a unique and distinct Arab personality. But
as we discover in this book, this interior domain,
which they identified as their true personality,
required quite a bit of invention, of which their
colonial predecessors had already unearthed and
manufactured generations earlier. The irony of
this is that the most creative aspect of such
nationalism, whose intention is “to fashion a
‘modern’ national culture that is nevertheless
not Western,” was in fact first launched by the
colonizers. It was the latter who created a
discourse of colonial difference so as to mark,
both culturally and racially, the Other as
temporally and spatially distant, creating in
effect a narrative script which Arab nationalist
would only slightly revise.
Notice that in all the cases above the movements
worked within the given constraints provided to
them by the colonizer’s gaze to force the Other
into a faraway time and place. Indeed, the
method these movements used to assert their
own identity had already been narrated long
before the appearance of any of these
movements. What Occidentalizers like Herzl,
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Ataturk, and Islamists like Qutb, Khomenei,
and bin Laden did was simply to take the
constructions provided by the Orientalist
system and tugged on one or the other side,
recreating the images of what they now
understood as their authentic self. The only
difference is which side of the rope they
tugged on. For Herzl and Ataturk they used
every muscle in their body to tug their
“nation” out of the Orient while for the
Islamists, with the help of the Almighty,
everything possible was done to pull the
Umma back towards Medina and Mecca—
one side desiring to remove the Orient while
the other cleansing Islam from the toxins of
the Occident. The cultural schizophrenia of
the Arab nationalists stood in the middle and
was unsure which side of the rope to pull on,
but it knew, deep down, that it must in order
to “improve” its subjects. Yet, in all three
cases “the West,” in some mysterious way,
remained solidly in place. As Leila Ahmed
has persuasively argued, even the most
radical sounding narratives never seem to
break free from the Orientalist categories to
which they are responding. Rather, they tend
to “appropriate, in order to negate, the
symbolic terms of the original narrative.
Standing in relation of antithesis to thesis,

the resistance narrative thus reverse—but
thereby also accept—the terms set in the first
place by the colonizers.”
The book will end with the search for what I
call “Post-Orientalist” movements. There are
now emerging individuals and movements
that see the limits of working within the
world that the colonizer taught us to inhabit
and are looking for ways to articulate a self
that allows our collective egos to dissipate a
bit and become calmed by the actual
interconnected space and time of Self and
Other. This book will end by briefly
exploring some intellectuals who are turning
away from the colonizer’s temporal template
so as to live in a world not determined by a
standard of measurement that is highly
judgmental and insulting, but inhabited by a
compassionate Being that allows all of us to
live free of the tools of an obsessed
collective mind to transform us into an
image of development.
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